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It Takes a Rooted Village: Networked Resistance, Connected 
Communities, and Adaptive Responses to Forest Tenure  
Reform in Northern Thailand
Kimberly Roberts
► Roberts, K. (2016). It takes a rooted village: Networked resistance, connected communities, and adap-
tive responses to forest tenure reform in northern Thailand. ASEAS – Austrian Journal of South-East Asian 
Studies, 9(1), 53-68. 
Conflicts persist between forest dwelling communities and advocates of forest conserva-
tion. In Thailand, a community forestry bill and national park expansion initiatives leave 
little space for communities. The article analyzes the case of the predominantly ethnic 
Black Lahu village of Huai Lu Luang in Chiang Rai province that has resisted the threats 
posed by a community forestry bill and a proposed national park. The villagers reside on a 
national forest reserve and have no de jure rights to the land. This article argues, however, 
that through its network rooted in place and connected to an assemblage of civil society, 
local government, and NGOs, Huai Lu Luang has been able to stall efforts by the Thai 
government that would detrimentally impact their use of and access to forest resources. 
Their resistance is best understood not in isolation – as one victimized community resist-
ing threats to their livelihoods – but in connection to place, through dynamic assemblag-
es. A ‘rooted’ networks approach follows the connections and nodes of Huai Lu Luang’s 
network that influence and aid the village’s attempts to resist forest tenure reform.
Keywords: Community Forestry; Ethnic Minorities; Resistance; Rooted Networks; Thailand

INTRODUCTION
In the face of global concerns over deforestation and conservation, throughout 
the highlands of Southeast Asia, the narrative of upland communities as forest 
destroyers persists. This concept that people and forests are mutually exclusive 
has direct implications when policies aimed at stalling or reversing deforestation 
rates run in contradiction to the livelihoods of communities living within these 
forests. Political ecologists have long investigated these relationships between 
nature and society (Blaikie & Brookfield, 1987; Robbins, 2004) and have explored 
state territorial expansion through forests (Bryant, 1997; Vandergeest & Peluso, 
1995), the mechanisms behind resource use and access (Peluso & Lund, 2011; 
Ribot & Peluso, 2009), the appropriation of land for conservation (Adams & Hut-
ton, 2007; Roth, 2008), and how these forest governance mechanisms impact 
local communities (Hares, 2009; Vandergeest, 2003; Walker, 2003; Wittayapak, 
2008).
In Thailand, community forestry policies, the expansion of the national park 
system, and a community land deed pilot project represent attempts to reduce 
Aktuelle Südostasienforschung  Current Research on Southeast Asia
w
w
w
.s
ea
s.
at
   
 d
oi
 1
0.
14
76
4/
10
.A
SE
A
S-
20
16
.1
-4
54 Kimberly Roberts  ASEAS 9(1)
deforestation rates and provide opportunities to either exclude communities from 
forests or incorporate them within the management of these ecosystems. Between 
1961 and 2005, forest coverage in Thailand decreased from 53.3% to 31.5% (World 
Bank, 2016), giving Thailand one of the highest deforestation rates in Southeast Asia. 
More recent calculations suggest a slight increase in forest cover to roughly 33% (Leb-
lond & Pham, 2014). However, pressure still remains from the Thai Royal Forestry 
Department (RFD) to conserve the remaining forests (Wittayapak, 2008). The 1985 
National Forest Policy strives to maintain the country’s forest cover and in 1989, the 
Thai government implemented a nationwide logging ban (Johnson & Forsyth, 2002, 
pp. 10-11; Vandergeest & Peluso, 2006, pp. 377-379). This shift in forest policy from 
timber to conservation management relies on the stringent separation of people 
from forests (Walker, 2003, p. 2) and eventually devalues traditional swidden agri-
culture and non-timber forest product (NTFP) harvesting practices of the roughly 6 
million highland ethnic minorities of Southeast Asia who live within the boundaries 
of protected areas (Badenoch, 2006). The notion that forests and people cannot co-
exist implies that forest dwellers must be evicted in order to protect forested areas. 
Holders of this position argue that deforestation is caused by population increases 
and by illegal forest encroachment for activities like shifting cultivation (Walker & 
Farrelly, 2008, p. 377). Due to the illegality of residing within forest reserves, most 
upland villages live under the threat of eviction – a threat which is occasionally real-
ized (Peluso & Vandergeest, 2011, p. 595). In 1991, an estimated 20% of the 56,000 
villages in Thailand were located within forest reserves (Bugna & Rambaldi, 2001). 
A detailed survey of 1,400 communities undertaken by the Department of Land De-
velopment in Chiang Mai province around this time found that 90% were located 
within forest reserves meaning that a large number of upland communities are ac-
tually illegal (Walker & Farrelly, 2008, p. 377). By 2000, the Department of National 
Parks (DNP) had established 13 national parks, resulting in the relocation of over 200 
communities (Srimongkontip, 2000). According to Leblond (2010), the majority of 
these conservation-induced relocations took place in the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
with a higher risk of relocation for non-Karen ethnic minority groups.1 The most 
famous of these relocation attempts was the Khor Jor Kor scheme of the early 1990s. 
After the 1991 coup, the military government attempted to evict five million people 
from reserve forests (Hall, 2011). During the initial implementation of the program, 
at least 16 villages were relocated. The number of households affected ranges from 
two thousand to as many as forty thousand (Walker & Farrelly, 2008). However, the 
scheme was shelved after vigorous protests from farmer organizations and civil so-
ciety groups (Hall, 2011; Walker & Farrelly, 2008). However, recent changes in Thai 
politics have again raised this threat of eviction. On June 2014, the current junta’s Na-
tional Council for Peace and Order issued two orders, the first stating that encroach-
ers in protected areas and poachers of forest goods will face strict legal measures and 
the second stipulating that the poor and communities settled in protected areas prior 
to this policy will not be affected (Editor2, 2015).
This article converges on the interactions of Huai Lu Luang, an ethnic minor-
1 Out of the 12 officially recognized ethnic minority groups in Thailand, Karen are the largest (353,000), 
with Hmong (112,000), and Lahu (82,000) following in size. Karen are also the only group that can claim 
to be ‘indigenous’ in Thailand (Forsyth & Walker, 2008).
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ity village in northern Thailand, as it responds to challenges to their forest access 
through relationships that assemble, disassemble, and shift over space and time. Fo-
cusing on three distinct mechanisms that could alter Huai Lu Luang’s de facto use 
of forest resources in Thailand, the article looks at the community forestry bill, a 
proposed national park, and a proposed community land deed pilot project. These 
mechanisms are initiated in separate agencies, the Royal Forestry Department, the 
Department of National Parks, and Thai Parliament, respectively. Huai Lu Luang’s 
responses to each of these mechanisms are best understood not as an isolated com-
munity, but instead through an assemblage of relations. In the literature, the actions 
of marginalized minorities get cast as either events of strength, as in the Chiapas re-
bellion of 1994 in Mexico (McMichael, 2008), or as everyday actions of resistance that 
remain a powerless community’s only recourse (Jones, 2012; Scott, 1985). However, as 
Rocheleau (2015) showed in Chiapas, many of these resistances do not take shape in 
isolation, but through networks, rooted in place and strengthened through a web of 
civil society and communities. 
Huai Lu Luang’s rootedness connects to Michaud’s (2006) Southeast Asia mas-
sif. Approximately 80 million people reside within the Southeast Asian massif (usu-
ally above 500m) of mainland Southeast Asia, stretching across Myanmar, Thailand, 
Laos, China, Cambodia, and Vietnam (Michaud, 2006, pp. 2-5). These ‘minority’ pop-
ulations are larger than the population of Myanmar, Thailand, Laos, or Cambodia. 
However, representing numerous transnational ethnicities, these highland peoples 
typically reside in the periphery of their nation states and are often categorized as 
backward, barbarian, uncivilized, and wild (McCaskill & Kampe, 1997; Scott, 2009; 
Vandergeest, 2003; Vienne, 1989). Moreover, with their subsistence livelihoods, mo-
bile communities, and diversity – all of which are hard to govern and difficult to tax 
– they pose a threat to settled agrarian states (Bryant, 1997; Scott, 2009).
Literature on resistance incorporates any form of resistance to impositions from a 
dominant power (Baviskar, 2001; Peluso 1992; Scott, 1985), suggesting that any activ-
ity can be political (Jones, 2009). In the uplands of Southeast Asia, Scott (2009) con-
ceptualizes the resistance of communities as anarchist. Yet, contemporary Huai Lu 
Luang, rooted in place, engage with civil society, neighboring communities, NGOs, 
and local government. Huai Lu Luang has ‘resisted’ threats to their forest resource 
use and access through both avoidance and defiance as well as cooperation. As in 
Chiapas, this resistance is best understood in connection to place, through dynamic 
assemblages. Rocheleau and Roth’s (2007) analytical framework of ‘rooted’ networks 
allows for a way to follow the connections and nodes of Huai Lu Luang’s network 
that influence and aid the village’s attempts to influence various branches of the Thai 
government’s forest tenure reform efforts. These are not the sterile networks of some 
types of complexity theory, but are rather rooted, disrupted, and shaped by terri-
tory, infused with power, containing social and natural nodes and exhibiting both 
static and dynamic characteristics. Such network thinking allows for an exploration 
of these actions and actors that resist dominant powers. Hence, in understanding the 
situation of rural, landless communities, we must carefully trace their connections to 
both human and non-human entities and seek to understand how power shapes the 
nature of those connections (Rocheleau & Roth, 2007).
56 Kimberly Roberts  ASEAS 9(1)
HUAI LU LUANG VILLAGE 
Huai Lu Luang is a village of roughly 400 people and is located in Mae Yao sub-dis-
trict, Muang district, in Chiang Rai province alongside the Mae Kok river at roughly 
475m elevation. The Lahu people of Huai Lu Luang have responded to, prepared for, 
and adjusted to external forces affecting their lives and livelihoods since the begin-
ning of the 20th century. Originating in southern China, Lahu are part of the Tibeto-
Burman language family group. Over the last two centuries, they have dispersed and 
migrated across the uplands of Southeast Asia. The largest population of Lahu still 
resides in southern Yunnan (China) (approximately 453,700 people in 2000), while an 
estimated 78,000 live in the Shan state of Myanmar, 103,000 in northern Thailand, 
and less than 16,000 are dispersed between Laos and Vietnam (Michaud, 2006, pp. 
130-131). 
Huai Lu Luang’s history and networks start in the early 20th century in the re-
mote mountains of Yunnan. Three generations ago, in the 1940s,2 many of Huai Lu 
Luang’s ancestors lived in southern China, converted to Christianity, practiced shift-
ing cultivation on the slopes of mountains, and grew rice in lowland paddy fields. 
According to Lahu Baptist Convention staff, in 1896, the American Baptist mission-
ary William Marcus Young moved to the Shan state of Myanmar. From Keng Tung, 
Young’s missionary work expanded north to Yunnan province where many of the 
Black and Yellow3 Lahu people converted to Christianity (Lahu Baptist Committee, 
personal communication, March 31, 2009). Mao’s communist China brought with 
it religious persecution, demand up to 80% of the villager’s crops, and forced labor. 
Thus, many Yellow and Black Lahu moved from southern China to Keng Tung. In 
the 1960s, the military junta took power in Myanmar, once again restricting villager’s 
religious freedom and forcing some into labor camps. Yet again, many Black and Yel-
low Lahu were forced to leave and migrated from Myanmar to Thailand to create 
the village of Obsuawan in the northern sub-district of Mae Yao. In 1962, mostly 
Yellow Lahu families from Obsuawan created the village of Panasawan. Around 1973, 
12 Black Lahu families separated from Panasawan and established Huai Lu Luang. A 
large influx of migrants from Myanmar between 1974 and 2006 increased the popu-
lation of the village household number from 30 in 1977 to 90 in 2010, with a total 
population of around 400 (village pastor, 18 October 2010). Religion and connec-
tions to ‘parent’ villages feature strongly in Huai Lu Luang. Just as spider plants drop 
new offshoots of roots when overcrowding, encouraging a relocation for access to 
greater nutrients and water (Rocheleau & Roth, 2007, p. 435), Huai Lu Luang became 
an offshoot of Panasawan, which itself was an offshoot of Obsuawan, which was an 
offshoot from a village in Keng Tung, Myanmar, which was an offshoot from a village 
in the Yunnan province of China. 
Today, a national forest reserve – first designated by the RFD – surrounds Huai 
Lu Luang. In 2002, the RFD gave permission to the DNP to work toward establish-
2 All dates referring to the migratory history and establishment of Huai Lu Luang result from oral his-
tory and are therefore to be regarded as generalizations.
3 Among the Lahu six subcategories are recognized (Michaud, 2006). Of these subcategories, Black, Yel-
low, and Red (English translations) live in the sub-district where Huai Lu Luang is located. From conversa-
tions with community members, there are linguistic and cultural distinctions between these groups.
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ing Lam Nam Kok National Park (Department of National Parks, 2015). The DNP is 
currently in the process of turning the forest reserve into the Lam Nam Kok National 
Park. Four districts and 13 sub-districts are located in the area proposed for the na-
tional park. In Mae Yao sub-district alone, this includes 13,000 people and 18 villages 
covering an area of 733 km2 (UHDP staff, 26 July 2015). Villagers of Huai Lu Luang 
have de facto but no formal (de jure) rights to the land that they use, which includes 
the forest and the fields that surround the village. The majority of households in Huai 
Lu Luang farm paddy fields, and few that do not, either share or rent fields from their 
neighbors. Moreover, all households farm upland fields and have access to a shared 
community forest (village pastor, 18 October 2010). The villagers plant rice in paddy 
fields as well as rice and corn in upland fields and have an average annual per capita 
income of THB 9000 (USD 250) (Kaiser et al., 2012). The lack of available land pre-
cludes the use of swidden agriculture, which Lahu historically practiced in China and 
Myanmar where they cultivated fields for three years and then fallowed fields for one 
to two years (Lahu Baptist Committee, 31 March 2009). Huai Lu Luang has roughly 
90 households, 95% of whom are Black Lahu and the remaining 5% are ethnic Yel-
low Lahu or Akha. The village has a history of organizing around committees, with a 
youth committee, church committee, and community forest committee. However, as 
a traditionally patriarchal society, only men serve on these committees (Community 
Forest Committee, 28 October 2010). 
The classification of Huai Lu Luang as a marginalized community harkens to its 
status as a ‘hill tribe’ (chao khao). In Thailand, chao khao make up only about 1.45% 
of the officially registered population and scant attention is paid to them (Michaud, 
2006, p. 240). There is, however, a popular narrative of chao khao as ‘forest destroy-
ers’. The Karen are the only ethnic group that have escaped the narrative of ‘forest de-
stroyers’ and instead have donned one of ‘forest guardians’ (Forsyth & Walker, 2008; 
Michaud, 2006). Thai government officials and the media characterize all other offi-
cially recognized ethnic groups as uncivilized and blame them for national problems 
such as deforestation. The term ‘hill tribes’ came into use in the 1950s to describe the 
non-ethnic Thai groups living in the uplands of northern and western Thailand that 
quickly became identified with the negative stereotypes of forest destroying, opium 
cultivating, and non-Thai troublemakers (Buergin, 2000). However, this narrative 
does not always reflect the reality on the ground (Sato, 2000, pp. 164-165) but further 
marginalizes ethnic, upland ‘hill tribe’ communities. 
APPROACH AND METHOD
This article uses Rocheleau and Roth’s (2007) framework of rooted networks to ana-
lyze how Huai Lu Luang – through its network – has responded to threats to forest 
access as well as opportunities to secure formalized access. Rooted networks utilize 
actor network theory’s ability to combine non-human and human entities and politi-
cal ecology’s placement of these entities within territories, literally ‘rooting’ networks 
to place. Building on these aspects, these networks then expand to understand con-
structs and interactions of nature and culture through a web of relations that carry 
power and polycentricity, situated knowledge(s), and rootedness and territory in its 
understanding of relations and processes (Rocheleau, 2008, p. 215). While the frame-
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work broadly seeks to address four challenges – placing power in networks, connect-
ing those networks to territories, incorporating natural and social elements, and inte-
grating static networks and dynamic system behaviors – this article focuses primarily 
on the first two. Treating roots and networks as active analogies to plants helps to 
understand how a network can be dynamic and still ‘rooted’ to a territory. Plant spe-
cies vary in fixity and mobility, individual and collective associations, and in relation 
to habitat. Extensive tap roots anchor some plants, spider plants send out new roots 
when resources become scarce, and fungal mycorrhizae networks aid plants’ ability 
to absorb nutrients in porous soils (Rocheleau & Roth, 2007). Like Rocheleau’s ex-
amples of resistance in Chiapas (2008) and the Dominican Republic (2009), Huai Lu 
Luang’s resistance is rooted in place and in a network of unequal coalition of NGOs, 
local government, and local community groups (Rocheleau, 2008; 2015).
My own work with Thai NGO Upland Holistic Development Project (UHDP) and 
my later role as an academic researcher place me as a small piece of Huai Lu Luang’s 
network. In 2007, I began my ongoing relationship with UHDP when I moved to 
their small agroforestry resource center. The center, established in 1997 in northern 
Thailand, took up space on a west facing hillside, barren at that time, but since then 
covered in agroforest, upland fields, orchards, fish ponds, agricultural plots, animal 
pens, and an assortment of homes that housed the mixed community of Lahu, Karen, 
Palaung, Kachin, and Akha staff and their families. Prior to interviews I conducted 
for my master degree, my work at UHDP had already acquainted me with the pre-
dicament of Huai Lu Luang’s community forest and its many layers. As a volunteer 
for UHDP from January to June 2007, I worked on counter mapping efforts for the 
community forests of villages in Mae Yao sub-district, including Huai Lu Luang. This 
included an overnight visit in April 2007 with UHDP co-director Bunsak Thongdi, 
hiking the boundaries of their community forest with the community forest commit-
tee and recording GPS waypoints. Later, in May 2007, I conducted GPS use trainings 
for members of Huai Lu Luang’s community forest committee as well as for neigh-
boring communities and in 2008, I became a liaison between the US NGO Plant With 
Purpose and UHDP. 
I returned to Huai Lu Luang between September and November of 2010, con-
ducting key informant interviews, group interviews, and semi-structured survey in-
terviews. For the semi-structured surveys, I interviewed 32 individuals (roughly 13% 
of the village’s population) and conducted follow-up interviews with the community 
forestry committee, village headman, and UHDP staff. Every interview was tape re-
corded and Warunee Harichaikul – a Lahu villager working at a Chiang Rai Lahu 
Boarding School – translated the interviews from Kham Mueang (Northern Thai lan-
guage) or Black Lahu to English. The survey interviewees were selected through a 
purposive sampling method, a type of non-probability sampling where I ascertained 
which units should be observed based on my judgment about which ones will be 
the most useful or representative (Babbie, 2007, p. 193). Based on participant obser-
vations, I noted that individuals of differing ages and genders used different forest 
resources in their daily lives; therefore, I selected the sub-groups of gender and age 
because I wanted to capture as much diversity as possible (see Table 1). Communities 
are not homogenous entities and the participation of only one ethnic group, social 
class, or gender in community forest governance may negatively impact that gov-
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ernance (Ratner & Moser, 2009). The age groups were chosen based on discussions 
with UHDP around labor divisions. 
THE ROOTED NETWORKS OF HUAI LU LUANG
Huai Lu Luang’s rooted network extends throughout the Southeast Asia massif, con-
necting it with communities and religious organizations in China, Myanmar, and 
Thailand, while being grounded through the ecological constraints and requirements 
of managing a community forest. Within Thailand, Huai Lu Luang connects with 
NGOs, civil society, and the sub-district government through dynamic arrangements 
that shift and alter depending on changing circumstances. The following section de-
scribes Huai Lu Luang’s efforts to either secure formalized land rights or to ensure a 
retention of current informal land use. To this end, they have joined national debates 
on community forestry, formed a network with neighboring villages and partner 
NGOs, and collaborated with the sub-district both to resist the creation of a national 
park and to apply for a community land deed.
National Community Forest Debates 
Community forestry represents a form of common-pool resource management. Con-
trary to Hardin’s (1968) tragedy of the commons, commons do not always lead to 
ungoverned territories and the deterioration of ecosystems, but instead often involve 
complex and sophisticated governing mechanisms (Agrawal, 2007; Thompson, 1975). 
Chhatre and Agrawal (2008) define the common pool resource of forest commons 
as “forests used in common by a large number of heterogeneous users” (p. 13286). In 
Thailand, variations of community forestry have a long history. These community 
forests show the characteristics of defined resource boundaries, user group identity, 
and property rights for resource benefits (Ostrom, 2002). In the last 30 years, compe-
tition for forest products between villages and business interest in combination with 
a nation-wide logging ban have caused a resurgence of community forestry efforts 
(Ganjanapan, 1998, p. 78; Li, 2002; Walker, 2003). 
In 1977, over concerns around forest degradation and water quality, Huai Lu Lu-
ang established a community forest, with de facto permission from the RFD (which 
later in 2001 transferred authority to the DNP). Representatives of the 30 families 
(one representative for each family) present in Huai Lu Luang at that time voted 
unanimously to accept the community forest, its committee, and its rules. According 
to the committee the community forest was established because:
Male Female
Age Group A (ages 19-34) 5 5
Age Group B (ages 35-49) 7 5
Age Group C (ages 50+ ) 5 5
Table 1. Number of Interviews by Age and Gender.  
Notes: Age group B contained male Yellow Lahu and age group C  
contained one male Akha respondent. (own compilation).
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Before the community forest, everybody did what was right in their own eyes 
concerning the forest. It’s a must to have a committee. Before, outsiders like 
Thai people cut the trees, and we had no authority to stop them, because we 
didn’t have the committee and the community forest. (Huai Lu Luang, 18 Oc-
tober 2010)
The committee itself is made up of 13 Black Lahu volunteer men broken up into 
the roles of president, vice president, secretary, and treasurer. Women are not al-
lowed on the committee or in any leadership role in Huai Lu Luang. The committee 
agreed on the community forest rules before they were submitted to the rest of the 
village for approval. However, Huai Lu Luang’s de facto community forest lacked for-
mal de jure status. At the end of the 1980s, groups of activities, academics, and NGOS 
began to argue for de jure local control of resources through community forests as 
an alternative to the forest conservation strategy of the RFD (Buergin, 2000, p. 11).
In 1990, the RFD wrote the first official draft of the community forestry bill to 
address the issue of forest tenure reform. According to Johnson and Forsyth (2002), 
development-based NGOs, academics, and grassroots organizations criticized this 
version for maintaining a state-led system of forest management. From this point, a 
back and forth process began with the community forest bill. In response to the RFD 
version, a coalition of activists and development NGOs drafted the first ‘people’s’ ver-
sion asserting the rights of local villages to enter and use forests (Johnson & Forsyth, 
2002, p. 14). Through Huai Lu Luang’s community forest, the village became actively 
involved in the community forestry debates in Thailand, with the survival of their 
de facto community forest hinging on the outcome of these debates. In 1999, some 
Huai Lu Luang villagers joined some roughly 3000 representatives of the different 
minority groups to demonstrate in Chiang Mai, demanding their right to citizenship, 
a simpler naturalization process, and recognition of their settlement and land use 
rights in protected areas (Buergin, 2000, p. 14).
Unfortunately, neither the RFD version nor the ‘people’s’ version of the commu-
nity forestry bill actually accounts for local use of forest resources (Walker, 2003). 
For swidden agriculturists, land is that of a shifting mosaic of forest, agroforest, and 
agriculture supporting their livelihoods and often increasing biodiversity of the area 
(Xu, Lebel, & Sturgeon, 2009). However, for villages like Huai Lu Luang, a lack of land 
security caused a spatial reorganization where they moved away from overlapping 
and flexible boundaries to more static and clearly delineated forests, upland fields, 
and paddy fields. As Roth (2008) references, this negotiation between state and com-
munity is a spatially produced process and reflects social and environmental rela-
tionships. For Huai Lu Luang, agriculture exists within the forest, and villagers both 
plant desirable species within their community forest and harvest products beyond 
timber from the forest. Villagers listed forest vegetables, wood for building houses, 
mushrooms, bamboo, food, firewood, herbs, banana flower, raising cattle, nuts, con-
struction wood and bamboo, water, string bamboo, medicine, land, and furniture 
as services they get from the community forest that they could not afford to pay for 
otherwise. The ‘forest’, for Huai Lu Luang is a component of an integrated landscape 
that provides long term and short term benefits and products. Larger debates sur-
rounding conservation have shifted Huai Lu Luang’s use of space from swidden agri-
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culture to agroforestry plots and backyard gardens. This allows community members 
to maintain their use of traditional forest products, while respecting the boundaries 
established by the DNP. 
Forest for the King and the Arrival of NGOs
In the midst of the community forestry debates, and in another attempt to secure ac-
cess to forest land, Huai Lu Luang set aside part of the forest for the King. Although 
Huai Lu Luang is a predominately Baptist Lahu village, Buddhist students from Chi-
ang Mai visited Huai Lu Luang and recommended that they dedicate a portion of the 
forest (not already designated as community forest) to the King in order to prevent 
the government from taking the land. In 1995, due to encouragement from these 
university students, the villagers conducted a Buddhist ceremony to set aside an ad-
ditional portion of 5,000 rai (800 ha) for the King. Concurrently, in the late 1990s, 
other NGOs began to work with Huai Lu Luang. One of their first established rela-
tionships was with the Thai-Lahu Baptist Convention (initiating projects on health, 
AIDS, drugs, environment, and community forestry), but later they established work-
ing relationships with the Mekong Minority Foundation (MMF), Mirror Founda-
tion, Compassion International, Community Organizations Development Institute 
(CODI), a Rice Bank, and UHDP. These organizations have worked independently 
and cooperatively with Huai Lu Luang, depending on the intersections of the various 
projects, each contributing to Huai Lu Luang’s rooted network. 
UHDP began working with Huai Lu Luang in 2006, with the original goal to im-
prove the networking and farming capacity of villagers and to increase their under-
standing of community forestry. UHDP was founded in 1996 by Baptist missionaries 
from the US, with an aim of assisting marginalized or resource poor ethnic minority 
communities along the Thai-Burma border (UHDP, 2 February 2007). The first year 
of Huai Lu Luang’s connection to UHDP involved the establishment of watershed 
networks. These networks provided a space for seven neighboring communities to 
meet and discuss their interactions with the sub-district government, RFD officials, 
and DNP. Through the network, UHPD also gave trainings in community forestry 
and related laws that provided a chance for neighboring villages to network and up-
date each other on the situations in their respective villages and to take a proactive, 
rather than reactive, stance to changes in forest policies. During these meetings, vil-
lagers talked about the potential problem of the proposed national park and encoun-
ters they had experienced with the DNP. In one case, the DNP offered THB 50,000 
(USD 1,670) to Huai Lu Luang villagers under the pretense of preserving the forest 
and giving the land to the DNP. One community forestry committee member de-
scribed his experience as this:
I sensed that something was wrong. The next morning the officer come again 
and asked for us to give them the land, but then on another day the officer said 
he wanted to negotiate with the villagers. That day I was not around, but then 
all the villagers signed their signature. Why they signed is because the govern-
ment said ‘we will give you 50,000 baht, this money is not to buy the land but 
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to help you save the forest’. When I found out the villagers had signed I went 
down to the headquarters and told the officer ‘it’s wrong for you to do that, 
to just ask some of the villagers to sign the signature in order to approve that. 
You have to get the signature from the headman all the way down through to 
the sub-district’. The officer that gave the money said he wouldn’t give money 
anymore. But it didn’t stop there, he came one more time and tried to entice the 
headman. But I said ‘you cannot do this, if you want to ask us to accept the mo-
ney, you must tell all of the villagers and ask them first whether they think it’s 
good and if they agree to sell the land or not. (Huai Lu Luang, 18 October 2010)
Although the villager encouraged Huai Lu Luang not to accept the money, that 
was not the case for neighboring villages. Panasawan (see Figure 1) received THB 
50,000 and lost the land they had used as a community forest. Eventually, Huai Lu 
Luang ended up giving Panasawan a portion of their community forest. In 2007, vil-
lagers proactively decided that they needed to map their own boundaries of the com-
munity forest so that they would not have to rely on DNP documents. This led to GPS 
trainings and GIS, which I designed for UHDP staff and members of this watershed 
network (see Figure 1).
Figure 1. Huai Lu Luang Community Forest. (Roberts, 2011).
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National Park Plans and Collaborations With Local Government
By 2008, the sub-district (tamboon)4 stepped in and showed support for the villages 
by helping them create more detailed maps. These maps used 1:4000 scale aerial 
photos and each household could trace the outline of their paddy and upland fields. 
The hope was that by designating the land and creating official maps, villages would 
have better negotiating tools with the DNP. In December 2008 and January 2009, 
the conflict over forest access came to a crisis when the DNP began a serious drive 
to establish the Lam Nam Kok National Park. According to UHDP, the DNP needed 
to get approval from communities within the different sub-districts before officially 
establishing the national park. The villages had to vote on 15 January 2009 about 
whether or not to allow the national park in their area. On 23 December 2008, the 
villages held a meeting, appointed two to three people from each village for a meeting 
with the tamboon on 28 December.
On 15 January 2009, the representative from Mae Yao sub-district rejected the na-
tional park. This vote forced the DNP to hold more formal communications with the 
tamboon and the villages themselves. According to UHDP staff members, the park 
was approved in all sub-districts except Mae Yao. So while the park was partially ap-
proved, boundaries have not been set and it has not been officially established:
Many things have started about the national park, they have a center, they have 
put up signs, but they still cannot get the approval from the central government 
because of Mae Yao. The national park has tried to work with the sub-district 
administrative governments. It happened in one area [not Mae Yao] that there 
was an official agreement between the national park and the local leadership 
that ‘okay we’re going to set the boundary between the national park and the 
community, but there’s no document. So they’re working on that. It’s not easy, 
because there’s no document. . . . In the case of Mae Yao, the department can’t 
get the approval from the local communities because people understand and 
through the work of UHDP and the watershed network, they are aware about 
these problems. Even the local leaders of Mae Yao, they understand and they 
indirectly support the local communities instead of working with the national 
parks on this process, they insist on getting approval from the local communi-
ties first. (UHDP staff, 28 July 2015).
Thai Parliament’s Community Land Deed Pilot Project
Simultaneously, while the DNP was pushing its national park plans, the central gov-
ernment was moving ahead with its pilot project of community land deeds (chanod 
4 The Tamboon Administration Act, established in 1992, sought to delegate more jurisdiction to sub-
district and district level administrations. As a result of this act, governance is divided between central, 
provincial, district, sub-district, and village level administrations. The ministries and departments fall 
under the jurisdiction of the central government, with its elected officials and appointed ministry posi-
tions. The central government also appoints provincial and district level officials. A district is composed 
of at least two sub-districts (tamboon) whose officials are locally elected for five years and operate under 
the supervision of the district chief officers. At the village level (mooban), a village headman is elected for 
five years. Both the tamboon and village headman positions are considered government officers and get a 
monthly remuneration from the central government (Government of Thailand, 2006, pp. 1-15).
64 Kimberly Roberts  ASEAS 9(1)
chumchon). A chanod chumchon is another alternative to the community forestry bill. 
Prime minister Abhisit Vejjajiva’s cabinet approved community land title deeds in 
June 2010. The objectives are to improve soil quality and provide land to poor farmers 
through the issuance of land rights certificates for communities living on state land 
(Chudasri, 2010). Chudasri (2010) suggested that the community land deed screening 
committee would give priority to communities that demonstrated a good land use 
plan with strong internal community control and a commitment to caring for natu-
ral resources. Against the background of the project, Huai Lu Luang shifted its focus 
from community forestry to obtaining a chanod chumchon. No longer concerned with 
just mapping and documenting the boundaries of the community forest, Huai Lu Lu-
ang began efforts to demonstrate that they had “a good land use plan with strong in-
ternal community controls”. Aided by the tamboon, they obtained 1:40000 air photo 
maps on which they meticulously traced all community land use from the forest, to 
the fields, to the village center. Additionally, my own research evaluated Huai Lu Lu-
ang’s capacity to effectively self-govern their community forest. These findings then 
strengthened Huai Lu Luang’s chanod chumchon application to demonstrate strong 
internal community control and a commitment to caring for the forest. However, as 
with the national park, the situation for Huai Lu Luang has not substantially changed 
since 2010. Due to the political turnover from Vejjajiva’s government to Yingluck Shi-
nawatra’s government to the 2014 military coup (BBC, 2015) the future of the chanod 
chumchon project remains uncertain.
CONCLUSION
Haui Lu Luang’s tale is not one of resounding success. Pressures on natural resource 
use and labor in China caused many villagers to migrate to Myanmar in the 1940s 
and similar pressures from the Burmese military junta in the 1960s caused a later 
undocumented migration to Thailand. In Thailand, Huai Lu Luang’s de facto use and 
access to forest resources has made their circumstances precarious in the midst of 
national concerns over deforestation rates and a racialized narrative that criminal-
izes ethnic minority communities inside forested areas. As a result of perceived and 
actual threats of relocation or forest access restriction, they involved themselves in 
national debates over community forestry, defiantly attending protests, while also 
trying to cooperate with restrictions placed on them by the RFD. As a Christian com-
munity, they respected the Buddhist national religion and dedicated part of the forest 
area they use in a Buddhist ceremony to the Thai King. In response to national park 
creation plans, they have counter-mapped the area of the forest that is unofficially 
designated as their community forest, not trusting the DNP maps. They joined a wa-
tershed network of neighboring villages and NGOs, which helped them to stay in-
formed on the interactions of their neighbors with the RFD and DNP and the rapidly 
changing policies from the Thai state that may affect them. They have collaborated 
with their sub-district government to hold the DNP accountable to its claims of an 
informed consent process over the creation of a new national park, and they have 
seized the opportunity to become part of a pilot project for community land deeds 
proposed by the prime minister’s cabinet in 2010. In this process, my research project 
itself became a piece of the community land deed application. Interviews conducted 
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with Huai Lu Luang villagers unearthed dozens of individual, community level, and, 
importantly for this article, network level actions that have been taken to either pre-
vent the direct loss of access to forest resources or to secure formalized rights to for-
est resources. 
Huai Lu Luang’s responses to the community forestry bill, a proposed national 
park, and a proposed community land deed pilot project are best understood not 
as acts of an isolated community, but instead through their ‘rooted’ network. It is 
through their affiliation with the Baptist church that the community first moved 
from China to Myanmar. In Thailand, this affiliation later connected them with 
UHDP, a new node with international connections. Huai Lu Luang’s relationship 
with their tamboon allowed a means of both cooperating with the DNP, as well as 
resisting any establishment of the national park that did not respect their land use. 
Some nodes, like their affiliation with national protests over an RFD influenced ver-
sion of the community forest bill died off, while others, like their relationship to their 
tamboon, continue to change as politics and elected officials change locally, provin-
cially, and nationally.
None of these relationships or actions have guaranteed Huai Lu Luang de jure 
rights. The community forest bill has not guaranteed access to the forest, the DNP 
still plans to establish Lam Nam Kok National Park, and chanod chumchon has an 
uncertain future. However, neither has the community forest bill nor the DNP cut 
off Huai Lu Luang’s access to the forest. Instead, Huai Lu Luang has demonstrated 
agency and choice. Through their ‘rooted’ network, connected to place and through 
an assemblage of individuals and organizations, they have stalled a loss of forest ac-
cess and use. They are neither passive victims of the political dynamics within Thai-
land nor actively resisting the government at every step, instead they are working 
within their networks to negotiate access. Through these networks, they have gained 
support from the tamboon, have collaborated with national movements, and have 
formed their own network of villages. These relations to other villagers, local gov-
ernment, religious groups, NGOs, and at times civil society, allow Huai Lu Luang to 
continue to respond to, prepare for, and, if need be, resist national and regional poli-
cies that could either aid or inhibit their attempts to secure formalized land rights.

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